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Growing awareness in the 1990s that HIV and AIDS were more prevalent in developing countries than in
industrialized ones and that effective treatments were available to only a few patients because of limited
government and personal incomes, transformed HIV/AIDS advocacy efforts. Pressuring governments and
pharmaceutical companies to ensure provision of treatment to larger numbers of HIV-infected persons
(often called “HIV-positive persons” or “persons living with HIV”) became a priority. The high prices of HIV
medications were quickly identified as a major barrier to access, and became the subject of a significant
ethical contention, which continues to this day. After providing background on the treatment of HIV
infection, this case will summarize the key features of the ethical contention.
Treating HIV Infections
HIV, Human Immunodeficiency Virus, destroys a person’s immune system by systematically destroying
CD4+ type T cells. Left untreated, HIV infections follow this progress:
1. initial acute HIV infection, occurring 2-4 weeks after exposure to HIV establishes an infection
(sometimes but not always marked by flu-like aches and fevers, which then abate),
2. asymptomatic HIV infection, lasting about 9 years on average after the initial acute infection
abates, during which the person appears healthy because the immune system has not yet
been weakened significantly,
3. early symptomatic HIV infection where the immune system is sufficiently weakened that other
infections occur more often and more severely than in persons with healthy immune systems,

This case was created by the International Dimensions of Ethics Education in Science and Engineering (IDEESE) Project at the
University of Massachusetts Amherst with support from the National Science Foundation under grant number 0734887. Any
opinions, findings, conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily
reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. More information about the IDEESE and copies of its modules can be
found at http://www.umass.edu/sts/ethics.
This case should be cited as: M.J. Peterson. 2010. “Access to HIV Treatments in Developing Countries.” International
Dimensions of Ethics Education in Science and Engineering. Available www.umass.edu/sts/ethics.

© 2010 IDEESE Project

Access to HIV Treatments Case Summary
4. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), marked by such severe compromise of the
immune system that the person dies from one or more “opportunistic infections” that take
advantage of the immune system’s weakness to catch and spread in the body.1
Initial hopes that HIV could be cured by a medicine that would cancel its effects or prevented by a vaccine
that would give people immunity to it have been disappointed so far. These hopes were and are sustained
by the existence of “non-progressives," individuals whose initial acute HIV infections faded and then
remained asymptomatic for the rest of their lives. Though clinical trials of an experimental vaccine in
Thailand during mid 2009 showed significant promise, both vaccines and cures remained distant prospects
in January 2010.2
The vast majority of persons infected with HIV can hope only to slow down the course of CD4+ cell
destruction and maintain a functioning though weakened immune system through continuing drug
treatments. These drug treatments are complex because simultaneous doses of several drugs are
required to slow down the course of infection. The current forms of Antiretroviral Treatment (ART) typically
combine three drugs: 2 nucleoside analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NARTIs or NRTIs) and either
a non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor (NNRTI) or a protase inhibitor (PI). NRTIs slow the spread
of HIV in the patient’s body by reproducing a faulty version of the virus’s genetic material. NNRTIs prevent
HIV’s reverse transcriptase enzyme from reproducing itself by binding to the virus’s protein.3 PIs keep
protease molecules from breaking the particular HIV proteins that become more effective disease agents in
smaller pieces. Any particular mix of drugs loses effectiveness over time, requiring patients to shift
medications periodically. Since each drug also has side effects, patients on ART often suffer from nausea,
headaches, weakness, malaise (a general sick feeling), and fat accumulation on the back and abdomen.
Long courses of treatment also increase the risk of heart attack. Infected persons also need to monitor
their condition with blood tests checking CD4+ counts and levels of HIV infection (by measuring HIV RNA
level, which indicates how much virus is in the blood) every 3 to 6 months. The goal of treatment is to keep
the CD4+ count from dropping further, and to reduce the HIV viral load to an undetectable level. In sum,
effective treatment of HIV requires provision of three elements: an initial test to determine whether the
infection is present, combination drug therapy to slow its development, and periodic testing to determine
whether the drug therapy is continuing to work or needs to be modified.
Treating HIV is complicated by features of the virus. First, it occurs in two major variants, designated HIV-1
and HIV-2 respectively. HIV-1 is more prevalent; HIV-2 can remain asymptomatic for longer periods but is
harder to treat because it is resistant to more antiretroviral medications than HIV-1. Both variants also have
distinctive sub-strains, with varying resistance to medications. HIV-1 appears in two main forms, Types A
1The

US National Institutes of Health provides good basic information about HIV and AIDS in its MedLine Plus online
encyclopedia. First consult the general entry on AIDS (http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000602.htm), then more
detailed entries about the successive stages of its normal progression (http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/
ency/article/000604.htm, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000682.htm,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/article/000603.htm, and http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
medlineplus/ency/article/000594.htm).
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and B. A and B are further divided into subtypes, groups, and strains. Some are quite difficult to treat.
One of the worst, a mutant version of HIV-1-B, designated 3-DCR, was identified in 2005. It is resistant to
many antiretroviral medications and produces fast-progressing infections leading rapidly to AIDS.4 3-DCR
illustrates the complex relations between viruses and their human carriers; the person whose blood tests
led to identification of the strain had engaged in unprotected sex with multiple partners and was also using
methamphetamine, a powerful stimulant that is illegal in most countries. Thus a particular HIV-infected
individual’s prospects also depend on which sub-strain is contracted at the time of exposure. 5
Developing countries, where HIV is most widespread, face the greatest obstacles to providing treatment.
They typically have to contend with lack of sufficient medical facilities for performing initial and follow-up
testing, inadequate medicine distribution and storage facilities, HIV-infected persons who have difficulties
understanding and following ART consistently, and the high cost of ART medications in relation to local
incomes or government health budgets. Since combination ART, which simplifies treatment by providing all
three medications in a single pill, became available in 1996 there has been significant progress in dealing
with all of these obstacles. However, the activists’ goal providing every HIV-positive individual with
constant access to effective ART is yet to be attained.
When HIV was first identified as the underlying cause of AIDS in 1982, the basic physical mechanisms of
T-cells’ role in the immune system had just been worked out and the particular way HIV reacted with CD4+
cells was not understood. By 1985, it was understood well enough for CD4+ cell counts to identify persons
infected with HIV.6 However, few people were tested, partly because being HIV-positive carried heavy
social stigma and partly because the tests were too expensive to use in developing counties. These limits
on initial screening inspired development of an indirect way to identify HIV-positive individuals by observing
the presence of other infections that individuals with healthy immune systems shake off easily. In the form
established by the World Health Organization (WHO), HIV infection is defined as having four stages:
Stage I:

HIV infection is asymptomatic;

Stage II:

minor mucocutaneous manifestations – including rashes or skin lesions -- and
recurrent upper respiratory tract infections;

Stage III

unexplained chronic diarrhea lasting more than a month, severe bacterial infections,
and pulmonary tuberculosis;

Stage IV:

(AIDS) toxoplasmosis of the brain, candidiasis of the esophagus, trachea, bronchi or
lungs, and Kaposi's sarcoma. 7

4 Reported in Nature Reviews Microbiology 3 (5): 370 (May 2005). The article noted the patient’s drug use but did not directly
suggest that this habit may have contributed to the mutation.
5

See “HIV types, subtypes, groups and strains” at http://www.avert.org/hiv-types.htm (accessed 27 March 2010).

The science is summarized in A. S. Fauci and others. 1984. “Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome: Epidemiologic, clinical,
immuniologic, and therapeutic considerations.” Annals of Internal Medicine 100: 92-106.
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Because it relies on observing infections that occur only after a person's immune system is compromised,
detecting HIV in this way meant that many HIV-infected persons started receiving ART too late for it to be
fully effective. Expanded multilateral and bilateral aid programs initiated after 1996 helped developing
countries to expand HIV testing and treatment facilities and follow the guidelines on providing ART
developed by the United States Centers for Disease Control in 1990. Under this system HIV-infected
individuals are put on ART when their CD4+ cell count falls below 500 cells per microliter of blood
(500/mL),8 and as suffering from AIDS when their CD4+ cell count drops below 200 cells per microliter (mL)
of blood. Though some HIV-infected individuals, including pregnant women and persons with HIV-related
kidney or neurological problems, are put on ART as soon as an HIV infection is detected, for most the start
of treatment is timed to coincide with the onset of early symptomatic HIV because of the medications’
strong side effects.
Developing country health services also developed more effective information campaigns in the late 1990s
and early 2000s. Some address slowing or preventing the spread of HIV by providing information about
how infection is transmitted and measures individuals can take to reduce their risk of exposure. Contrary to
the impressions circulated when HIV first emerged, infection is not spread by skin contact or saliva. It is
now well understood that infection is transmitted from person to person primarily through a) sex acts
(including oral and anal sex), b) transfusions of HIV-contaminated blood, c) use of HIV-contaminated
needles for injecting drugs, and d) pre-or post-natal transmission from infected mothers to newborns.
Greater awareness of the disease pathways have helped slow down the spread of HIV, reducing the
number of new cases encountered each year. Other information campaigns help HIV-infected individuals
understand why ART has been prescribed, what it involves, and the importance of taking the medications
and getting the follow-up blood tests consistently. Patients' ability to follow their therapy has been
increased as pharmaceutical companies, both the major innovating firms producing the patented medicines
and the generic manufacturers producing equivalent drugs, developed versions of combination ART taken
in a single daily dose (the “once a day pill”). Administering ART in warm countries where electricity is not
always reliable or even available has been facilitated by development of heat-resistant versions of the
drugs.
The annual per patient cost of administering ART has declined considerably. The $10,000 per person per
year cost prevailing in the USA in 1995 before combination and once a day therapies was reduced to about
$350 in 2001 as activist pressures everywhere for lower prices and generic production opened up. By mid2007, the cost had dropped to about $100 per person per year for “first line” ART using medications
developed in the mid-1980s. However, drug-resistant variants of HIV needed to be treated with newer
“second-line” drugs, most of which were still covered by patents and all of which are more expensive than
the “first-line” treatments. In 2007, the least expensive generic form of second-line ART treatment
preferred for use in developing countries, a heat-stable combination using lopinavir and ritonavir, cost $695
per patient per year.9 AIDS activists and others began warning about the price implications of having to
shift to “second-line” drug combinations in 2004 and continued exerting pressures on governments and
drug makers to reduce the prices as much as possible.10
8CDC

Guidelines available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmWR/preview/mmwrhtml/00054080.htm. The CDC also maintains its earlier
definition of AIDS as present when a patient suffers from an infection uncommon in persons with healthy immune systems.
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The Contention Over Drug Patents
Attacks on drug patents have been a prominent feature of campaigns against high ART prices. As Michael
Hagmann put in 2002, “The major obstacle to increased drug access – though not the only one – is patent
royalties.”11 Health GAP, an activist organization, is even more vehement; in its view “the human right to
life and to health must prevail over the pharmaceutical industry’s excessive profits.”12 This has been a very
attractive argument because patents do create artificial monopolies on production by allowing the patent
holder to decide whether to let others use the advance covered by the patent by giving them a license and
what to charge anyone granted a license. Patent systems in the industrial countries had long included
drugs among the innovations that could be patented, and in both the 1980s and today give the inventor a
20-year monopoly on production and sale of the product protected by the patent. These limited-duration
monopolies had become central to the economic calculations of two sets of innovator pharmaceutical firms:
major manufacturers like Bristol-Meyers Squibb, GlaxoSmithKline, or Hoffmann-LaRoche that maintain
their own research departments and produce the drugs their researchers develop themselves, and a set of
smaller firms that specialize in drug development and license other firms with production facilities to
manufacture the drugs they develop.
The controversy over patents became so intense because the continuing lack of either a preventive or a
prophylactic vaccine against HIV means there is no alternative to long term ART. Thus, AIDS activists
(who include both persons suffering from HIV infections or AIDS and noninfected supporters) have
complained vociferously about prices and demanded that ART be available to everyone who needed it
regardless of income. They have been joined by healthcare access advocates defining access to
“essential medicines” – or to healthcare more generally – as a human right in campaigns for elimination or
stringent limitation of drug patents. The campaign against patents on ART therapies was also quickly
linked to the already-initiated transnational campaign against the expansion of intellectual property rights
included in the 1994 Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). TRIPS is one of
several agreements addressing specific concerns developed during the Uruguay Round of international
trade negotiations that produced the World Trade Organization and a revised General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade. It is also one of the agreements that all states joining the WTO are required to accept as part of
their membership. Industrial countries had to implement TRIPS immediately while developing countries
were allowed transition periods before they had to implement TRIPS by revising their patent law and
enforcing the new rules. Some developing countries, including Brazil had a 5-year transition period,
meaning they would have to start implementing in 2000. Most developing countries, including India, had a
10-year transition period. The least developed countries were allowed a longer transition, one currently
scheduled to end in 2016.
The main argument in favor of patents is that they serve the general interest by promoting invention and
speeding up the process of turning inventions into marketable products. The underlying economic
calculation is that the long term gain to society as a whole more than offsets the benefits of the temporary
monopoly enjoyed by patent holders during the term of their patents. This proposition has been contested
among economists (though more intensely in the field of copyright because computer software has been
Michael Hagmann. 2002. “World Trade Organization still threatens supply of affordable AIDS drugs.” Bulletin of the World
Health Organization 80(9): 762.
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treated as a form of expression rather than a material thing). So far their arguments have not been
accepted widely enough to overturn whole patent systems, though particular points have inspired
modifications to limit the sorts of things that can be patented.
However, the concerns about access to HIV treatments are focused primarily on the immediate to medium
term, about providing medications to persons identified as needing them. Although the lifetimes of HIVinfected persons have been extended with ART, everyone knows that without ART their lives would be
much shorter and much more miserable once the early symptomatic phase sets in. Those who oppose
compulsory licensing or other forms of weakening drug patents have not been able to challenge the need
for the medications; they have been limited to using a longer-term argument, that abolition or large-scale
overriding of drug patent rights will not be helpful in the long term because it will inhibit the continuing
innovation needed to develop anti-retroviral therapies as HIV mutates in response to current treatments.
The contention over ART prices and patents played out in two major rounds. The first, running from 1996
through roughly 2002, initially involved AIDS activists in industrial countries, particularly ACT-UP (AIDS
Coalition to Unleash Power) in the USA, who attracted broad public support for their efforts to bring down
the prices of the first-line antiretroviral therapies. As awareness of HIV prevalence in developing countries
increased, the campaign went transnational, with local activists and governments in developing countries
also seeking ways to bring down the price. This second round of contention, which arose in 2004-2005 and
continues today, involves efforts to ensure that prices of the newer second-line treatments are kept as
close to those of the older first-line ARTs as possible. In both phases, the AIDS activists and other
campaigners have used a “patients versus profits” framing that casts the major innovator drug firms as the
main source of the problem. Activists have also used human rights rhetoric to prod governments as well,
advancing the linked claims that governments have, and should take up, a duty to distribute ART to
everyone who needs it, and that governments taking up that task should be able to acquire all the
medications they need at prices they can afford. Both the "patients versus profits" and human rights
framings have been extremely effective. They present the issue in a particular light and guide audiences
thinking toward the activists preferred solutions by presenting those solutions in a context in which they
appear to be uncontestable common sense.13
Thus, it is not surprising that activist pressure elicits wide public support in both industrial and developing
countries. This has put the leading pharmaceutical companies in a position where they have been
constrained to lower prices. Economists point out that having different prices in different markets causes
problems by encouraging parallel trading – buying large amounts of a product in the lower-price market and
then selling them in a higher-priced market – that make unusually high profits for those engaged in the
trading while siphoning supplies from the low-cost market to the higher-cost market. The likelihood of
parallel trading is low (though not eliminated14) with ART medications since they are typically bought by or
on behalf of government health services in quantities related to domestic need.

Sidney Tarrow 1998 Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, Chapter 7 (2nd Edition, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press) provides a good summary of research on the importance of effective framing for activist success.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink 1998 Activists beyond Borders: Transnational Advocacy Networks in International Politics
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press) remains one of the leading applications of the ideas to transnational issue campaigns.
13
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Round One
The first round of contention occurred in the interval between adoption of TRIPS and its extension to major
developing countries. This fortuitous timing made it much easier for the government of Brazil to adopt an
ambitious program of providing antiretroviral therapy to every HIV-positive person in Brazil regardless of
income in 1997 because it was able to acquire generic versions of the necessary drugs. Until 2000 neither
Brazilian nor foreign firms were constrained to respect anyone else’s drug patent in deciding what to make
for the Brazilian market. Between 2000 and 2005 the Brazilian government could also continue to import
from Indian generic makers because India was not obliged to protect foreign drug patents. Brazilian
demand for generic ART pressed prices downward in three ways. First, that demand helped Indian
generics makers increase their manufacturing capacity, realizing economies of scale that got passed along
in power prices. Second, the new scale of their operations also inspired an expansion in the production of,
and hence lower prices for, the active pharmaceutical ingredients needed to make antiretroviral
medications. Third, Brazilian threats to issue compulsory licenses on patented drugs combined with the
size of the overall Brazilian drug market meant the government could secure price concessions from
patent-holding firms seeking to limit the fostering of competitors that would occur if compulsory licenses
were issued.
UN agencies become more involved in HIV/AIDS issues during 1996 with creation of the Joint United
Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS). AIDS received high-level political attention at the May 2000
meeting of the World Health Assembly, the primary decision-making body of the WHO, which directed the
staff to develop a global plan for combating HIV. This was a significant reversal for WHO, which had
dismantled its separate AIDS office in 1995 in anticipation of shifting those activities to UNAIDS. The
heads of state and government who met at the UN-organized Millennium Summit in September 2000,
stated a commitment to slowing the spread of HIV and broadening access to treatment in the Millennium
Development Goals. Specifically, Goal 6 on combating HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases sets targets
of a) halting and starting to reverse the spread of AIDS by 2015, b) achieving universal access to HIV/AIDS
treatments for all who need them by 2010.15 The UN General Assembly followed with a Declaration of
Commitment on HIV/AIDS in September 2001 and a follow-up Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS in June
2006.16 While these statements had no immediate effect on the prices of ART, they did indicate that HIV
and AIDS were considered important enough problems to receive attention at the highest levels of
government, and that UN approaches to HIV/AIDS would be defined within a strong human rights-oriented
framing of the problem.
These statements provided a broader political context within which individual governments pursue their
policies on AIDS. Brazil, in particular, persisted in its commitment to provide ART to all individuals who
needed it regardless of income. This meant the Brazilian health service was purchasing significant
quantities of ART drugs. The extent of the Brazilian market was a significant factor in the decision by
Indian generics maker Cipla to offer ART for approximately $395 per patient per year in mid 2001. This
accomplishment put significant pressure on the major drug companies to reduce the prices of their
15 The text of the Millennium Development Goals is available through http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/aids.shtml (accessed 29
April 2010).
16 General Assembly Resolution S/26-2, annex adopted on 27 June 2001 and General Assembly Resolution 60/262 adopted on
2 June 2006 available at http://www.un.org/documents/resga.htm (accessed 29 April 2010) and in Appendix B.
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products. Activists were not shy about demanding lower prices or about shaming the major drug
companies whenever they attempted to protect their patent rights. The 39 drug companies that had been
trying to sue the South African government for patent violations because of its decision to permit domestic
production of generic AIDS medicines abandoned their efforts in April 2001. One of the firms involved,
GlaxoSmithKline, then licensed Aspen, a major South African generics producer, to produce designated
quantities of their patented AZT, 3TC and Combivir without royalty charges.17
Continuing pressures on drug companies created the second form of response: tiered pricing based on a
country’s presumed ability to pay. In mid 2001, the major pharmaceutical firms participating in the
Accelerated Access Initiative agreed to a “tiered” pricing system. Governments and individuals in industrial
countries would pay full price for the drugs; governments and individuals of the higher income developing
countries would get a discount of about 30%; governments of least developed countries would get a 90%
discount.17 Developing countries also receive assistance in the purchasing process through the Group of
8’s Global Fund for AIDS, Malaria, and Tuberculosis, UNITAID established by a coalition of European and
other governments, the USA’s PEPFAR, and the Clinton Foundation.
By then policy analysts were considering the balance that should be struck between intellectual property
rights, profits, and patient needs and offering various ways of modifying normal market practices to better
serve the latter without completely ignoring the former. Amir Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White proposed a
deal in which governments would respect patents and in return pharmaceutical makers holding the patents
would provide HIV drugs to the “global poor” at break-even prices. If that could not be arranged, they
advocated either limiting patentability of certain medications, including HIV treatments, in the poorest
countries or developing an industry practice of issuing licenses to generics makers sufficient for them to
supply poor countries.18 Udo Schenk and Richard E. Ashcroft preferred starting with compulsory licenses
because they believed these were the most effective way to reduce drug prices.19
The first round of contention about ART prices also became an element in the ongoing campaign by
transnational activist groups to secure abolition or significant revision of the TRIPS Agreement. Abolition
was unlikely. TRIPS is generally presented by antiglobalization activists as a scheme hatched by Western
(particularly US) firms to maintain their dominant positions in the global economy, but innovative firms in a
number of the more advanced developing countries also supported extensions of intellectual property
rights.20 Yet even governments and firms supporting the basic TRIPS rules were willing to consider
proposals for certain revisions.

The UN Conference on Trade and Development maintains the agreed list of least developed countries. There is no single list
of developing countries, but for most purposes the countries in the high middle income and low middle income lists of the World
Bank’s classification of economic levels are regarded as developing. See World Bank classification at
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:20420458~menuPK:64133156~pagePK:6413
3150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html (accessed 27 March 2010).
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Attaran and Lee Gillespie-White, 2001. “Do patents for antiretroviral drugs constrain access to AIDS treatment in Africa?”
JAMA: Journal of the American Medical Association 286(15): 1891.
Udo Schuklenk and Richard E. Ashcroft. 2002. “Affordable access to essential medicines in developing countries: Conflicts
between ethical and economic imperatives.” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27(2): 179-195.
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20Including

firms in India seeking to move from generics to more innovative products. See remarks of Satash Reddy, Managing
Director of Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, quoted in K.S. Jayaraman, “Indian law could choke cheap drug supply,” Nature Medicine
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The campaign to reduce the impact of TRIPS on HIV medication prices was facilitated by the fact that this
was a health issue. TRIPS already included provisions allowing governments to issue compulsory licenses
for the production of patented medications in the event of a "health emergency." Though hedge buying a
number of rules, the possibility of compulsory licenses didn't mean governments did not have to simply
stand by and let pharmaceutical companies charge whatever they would, even in countries that do not
normally set price controls for medicines. The problem with the initial version of compulsory licenses under
trips was that the government issuing the license could only authorize production for its own domestic
market. This limitation was included to ensure compulsory licenses would not be used as a tool of
industrial policy by giving domestic firms a competitive boost by letting them ignore patents.
However, one feature of the market for ART medications meant that compulsory licenses would not affect
markets as trade lawyers anticipated. In the situations they typically consider, capacity to produce the good
is fairly widespread and it is easy to find a domestic producer. However, many developing countries lacked
production capacity and were unlikely to develop it very soon because they lacked necessary raw
materials, sufficiently reliable and cheap energy, local demand sufficient to support economically
competitive scales of production, and enough workers capable of engaging in quality drug production.21
Using their power to issue compulsory licenses would do those countries no good because they would not
be able to find a domestic firm capable of using the license. It was therefore easy for AIDS activists
seeking wider access to drugs and governments of developing countries seeking greater choice among
suppliers to converge on proposals that TRIPS rules on compulsory licenses should be widened to include
what trade lawyers call “parallel importing” – securing supplies of HIV drugs from generic drug makers in
other countries. This requires agreement that governments without domestic production capacity could
choose generic suppliers elsewhere and that governments with domestic capacity issuing compulsory
licenses could extend those licenses to include production for other countries as well as for their own
domestic market.
European governments had largely agreed with the idea by the summer of 2001,22 but the US government
was resisting. However, the G.W. Bush administration handed activists the material needed for shaming it
into agreeing in the fall. Information that it was considering using a compulsory license to secure sufficient
supplies of Cipro, an antianthrax treatment covered by a patent held by Bayer, in the wake of the anthrax
letter scares was widely reported in the US press. Though the US government eventually negotiated
discount deals with Bayer instead, the discussion of using compulsory licenses allowed health activists and
developing countries to paint US opposition to flexibility on HIV medicines as hypocritical and the US
government backed off.23 The coalition pressing for change was also able to muster enough support
11(5): 460 (May 2005) discussion of Indian firms attitudes available at
http://nopr.niscair.res.in/bitstream/123456789/2029/1/JIPR%2013(5)%20432-441.pdf
Noted by Roger Bate. 2009. “When local production is not the answer,” The American: Journal of the American Enterprise
Institute, 2 September 2009. Available at www.american.com/archive/september/bernarticle.2009-09-01.0954500383 (accessed
4 March 2010)
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Robert Watson. 2001. “European Union joins fight over drug patents,” British Medical Journal 323 (#7303): 12.

23Daniel W. Drezner. 2006. All Politics is Global: Explaining International Regulatory Regimes (Princeton: Princeton University
Press), p. 190. Contemporaneous reports included “A rush for Cipro and the global ripples” New York Times, 17 Oct. 2001,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/17/world/a-nation-challenged-the-drug-a-rush-for-cipro-and-the-globalripples.html?pagewanted=1
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among trade ministers to defeat an industrial country effort to include a limit that compulsory licenses be
used only for drugs on the WHO’s list of “essential medicines.”24
The November 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha, Qatar agreed to increase the “flexibility”
institutionalized in government powers to issue compulsory licenses by allowing production under
compulsory license not only for the local market but also for supplying any developing country that lacked
domestic ART manufacturing capacity.25 Though a declaration from a Ministerial Conference is a high-level
political commitment, such commitments gain greater practical significance when they are incorporated into
the formal rules. Incorporation soon followed. In 2003 the WTO Governing Council, the body of member
state trade officials who manage the WTO in between Ministerial Conferences, issued a “general waiver” to
Article 31 of TRIPS. This protected any member using the ministerial conference commitment against
complaints that it was violating its TRIPS obligations in the WTO Dispute Settlement Process by making it a
formal modification to the rules.26 Then in 2005 the WTO formally proposed amendments to the TRIPS
agreement that would convert the 2003 waiver into a stronger measure, a permanent exception specified
within the TRIPS Agreement itself. Conversion will be complete when a sufficient number of WTO member
states ratify the amendment. In the meantime, members can rely on the general waiver.
The change meant that any government – of an industrial state supplying developing countries with HIV
medications as part of an aid program, of a developing country with domestic generics producers capable
of supplying good quality HIV medications, or of a developing country seeking to import from generics
makers in other countries – could issue a compulsory license and decide for itself on what royalties to pay
the patent holder. However, the immediate effects of this change were limited. First, the Indian firms who
were the world’s major source of generic ART medications were not yet covered by TRIPS Agreement
rules. Everyone was aware, however, that they would be covered starting in January 2005 when India’s
transition period ended. When that happened, Indian generics makers would not be able to make any HIV
medication patented after 1995 – a date prior to the patents on most of the “second line” medications –
unless they held a license from the patent holder or a compulsory license from a government.27 Second,
developing country governments did not rush to test the new rules because they were aware that both the
USA and the EU were hostile to extensive use of the exception; Malaysia’s November 2003 compulsory
license to cover acquisition of three HIV treatments from Indian generics makers was the first to explicitly
invoke the "Paragraph 6" rule.28 Industrial and more advanced developing countries, including the EU,
Norway, Switzerland, Canada, China, and South Korea, revised their patent laws to authorize granting
compulsory licenses to domestic generics makers supplying developing countries.29 However, only

24Kristina

M. Lybecker and Elisabeth Fowler. 2009. “Compulsory licensing in Canada and Thailand: Comparing regimes to
ensure legitimate use of WTO rules.” Journal of Law, Medicine, and Ethics 27(2): p. 230.
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World Trade Organization document WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2. Available from http://docsonline.wto.org.
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Canada's program was tried to any extent, and its processes for identifying recipient governments and
issuing licenses proved sufficiently complex – four years elapsed from adoption of the change in 2004 and
delivery of the first shipment – that it was heavily criticized within Canada and also attracted little interest.30
In September 2003 as prices continued to fall, the WHO began planning an ambitious “3 by 5” program with
the goal of delivering ART to 3 million HIV-infected persons in developing countries within five years. The
program would rely on a limited set of combination ART medications, chosen from among the formulations
regarded as most effective in developing countries. Severe difficulties plagued the program from the start.
WHO lacked staff capacity to evaluate generic versions of ART, so relied on national testing in the country
of manufacture. However, the national testing was not always sufficient to assure the generic combinations
were as effective as the patented combinations they reproduced. Problems with the list became public
knowledge in May and August 2004 when WHO took some generic formulations made by Indian makers
Cipla and Ranbaxy off the list because of questions about the adequacy of the testing.31 The rate at which
WHO hoped to scale up treatment also exceeded the capacity of most of the national health services that
would be providing the actual treatment. These concerns about program design and adequacy led both the
Global Fund (which generally avoided funneling its aid through UN agencies) and PEPFAR to reject WHO
requests for financial support. The Canadian International Development Agency offered funding on
condition that there be an independent outside review of the program first. Even before the final review
report, which was highly critical of the program’s design and implementation, was issued in June 2006,32
the government of South Africa (which had not yet fully disavowed the extreme HIV denial that informed
government policy starting in 199933), had already refused to participate in 3 by 5 and was keeping the
WHO at arm’s length.
In the meantime other international collaborations helping developing country health services build up their
capacities to provide HIV treatment were underway through the Technological Network on HIV/AIDS, a
cooperation among Brazil, China, Nigeria, Russia, and Ukraine and the International Treatment
Preparedness Coalition, a program of technical cooperation among local NGOs and HIV treatment
providers in developing countries managed and supported by the German Agency for Technical
Cooperation.34
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Round Two
By the time WHO ceased pursuing “3 by 5” in 2006, the second phase of the contention over HIV treatment
prices was engaged. Again United Nations meetings strengthened the normative framework supporting
claims that HIV treatments should be provided to all who need them regardless of ability to pay. The
special meeting convened in September 2006 for a five-year follow-up on the 2001 Declaration of
Commitment on HIV/AIDS issued a new Political Declaration on AIDS. The preamble repeated the human
rights framing of the question, most directly in Paragraph 12:
12. Reaffirm[ing] also that access to medication in the context of pandemics, such as HIV/AIDS, is
one of the fundamental elements to achieve progressively the full realization of the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
Paragraph 15 stated the implications for trade and other policies:
15. Recogniz[ing] further that to mount a comprehensive response, we must overcome any legal,
regulatory, trade and other barriers that block access to prevention, treatment, care and
support; commit adequate resources; promote and protect all human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all; promote gender equality and empowerment of women; promote and protect
the rights of the girl child in order to reduce the vulnerability of the girl child to HIV/AIDS;
strengthen health systems and support health workers; support greater involvement of people
living with HIV; scale up the use of known effective and comprehensive prevention
interventions; do everything necessary to ensure access to life-saving drugs and prevention
tools; and develop with equal urgency better tools – drugs, diagnostics and prevention
technologies, including vaccines and microbicides – for the future;
The portion laying out policy commitments included several statements relating to drug patents and the
need for continuing innovation reflecting compromises among various positions in the debates:
43. Reaffirm that the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights does not and should not prevent members from taking measures
now and in the future to protect public health. Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to
the TRIPS Agreement, [we] reaffirm that the Agreement can and should be interpreted and
implemented in a manner supportive of the right to protect public health and, in particular, to
promote access to medicines for all including the production of generic antiretroviral drugs and
other essential drugs for AIDS-related infections. In this connection, we reaffirm the right to
use, to the full, the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health and the World Trade Organization’s General Council Decision of
2003 and amendments to Article 31, which provide flexibilities for this purpose;
44. Resolve to assist developing countries to enable them to employ the flexibilities outlined in the
TRIPS Agreement, and to strengthen their capacities for this purpose;
45. Commit ourselves to intensifying investment in and efforts towards the research and
development of new, safe and affordable HIV/AIDS-related medicines, products and
technologies, such as vaccines, female-controlled methods and microbicides, pediatric
antiretroviral formulations, including through such mechanisms as Advance Market
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Commitments, and to encouraging increased investment in HIV/AIDS-related research and
development in traditional medicine;
46. Encourage pharmaceutical companies, donors, multilateral organizations and other partners to
develop public-private partnerships in support of research and development and technology
transfer, and in the comprehensive response to HIV/AIDS;
47. Encourage bilateral, regional and international efforts to promote bulk procurement, price
negotiations and licensing to lower prices for HIV prevention products, diagnostics, medicines
and treatment commodities, while recognizing that intellectual property protection is important
for the development of new medicines and recognizing the concerns about its effects on
prices;35
The second round of controversy over the prices of HIV treatments arise even though the prices of first-line
treatments were continuing to decline because the various strains of the HIV virus were developing
resistance to those treatments. To maintain their immune systems, an increasing number of HIV-infected
individuals needed to start with or shift over to second-line treatments. These had been developed in the
1990s and were still under patent. Again the Brazilian government made the first moves because it had
scaled up its provision of ART earlier than other developing countries, so was the first to face widespread
need for second-line treatments. In 2005, Brazilian activists were claiming that the government was
spending 80% of the National Aids Program budget allocation for ART on imported patented drugs. They
further estimated that 70% of that spending was used to acquire sufficient doses of four medications:
Kaletra (Abbott Laboratories’s patented lopinavir/ritonavir combination), Viraid (Gilead’s patented version of
tenofovir), Sustiva (Merck’s patented version of efavirenz), and Viracept (Hoffmann-LaRoche‘s patented
version of nelfinavir).36 Hence they advocated intensifying pressure on drug companies to reduce prices
either through negotiations or through compulsory licensing. In June 2005 the Brazilian Chamber of
Deputies (lower house of the national legislature) adopted a draft determination authorizing the government
to issue compulsory licenses for local production of the lopinavir/ritonavir combination, tenofovir, and
efavirenz. Lobbying by US-based pharmaceutical companies, induced a degree of caution in the
government. However, it did continue to press for price reductions with considerable success. This pattern
was broken in 2007 when negotiations with Merck over the price of Sustiva (efavirenz) reached an
impasse. Merck was ready to reduce the price from $1.57 a pill to $1.10 a pill (from $573 per patient per
year to $401 per patient per year), but the Brazilian government was hoping to get a price more like the
$0.65 a pill ($237 per patient per year) paid by Thailand. Companies resisted because Brazil, was an
upper middle income country in the World Bank classifications and Thailand a lower middle income
country. The Brazilian government was so keenly interested in Sustiva because it is a "once a day" pill
more effective than most other non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitors. Activists estimated that
purchases at the Thai price rather than the $1.10 per pill Merck was offering would save the Brazilian
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government $30 million in 2007 alone and a total of $237 million by the time Merck's patent expired in
2012.37
These contentions between the Brazilian government and pharmaceutical firms only cover government
purchases of HIV treatments. The government exerts control over prices charged to private buyers through
its Chamber for the Regulation of the Market of Medicines, which must approve the price before a drug can
be sold in Brazil. Firms can petition for later adjustments, which the Chamber reviews once a year.38
The military government that ruled Thailand from September 2006 through January 2008 and its civilian
successor went further. The military government began in November 2006 by issuing a compulsory license
for production of Sustiva (efavirenz). In January 2007 it issued a compulsory license on Kaletra
(lopinavir/ritonavir combination) and on the heart drug clopidrogrel. Aware that the US pharmaceutical
firms were likely to seek US government support for trade countermeasures, the Thai government issued a
100 page explanation of its actions. This did not prevent the Office of US Trade Representative from
placing Thailand on its "priority watch list" of countries likely to ignore intellectual property rights, but did
impress activists with the Thai government’s openness and good faith in issuing the licenses. US-based
activists persuaded 22 members of the US Congress to publicly question the USTR’s actions. In January
2008, the Thai government also issued compulsory licenses covering three non-HIV drugs letrozole (a
breast cancer treatment patented by Novartis), docetaxel (a breast and lung cancer treatment patented by
Sanofi-Aventis) and erlotinib (a lung, pancreatic and ovarian cancer treatment patented by HoffmannLaRoche). On taking power the new civilian government stated that it would review the compulsory
licenses, but in the end decided to maintain the licenses while confirming that the Minister of Commerce
holds the authority to end them.
The major drug companies accepted that governments wanted assured access to antiretroviral therapies at
low prices, and were accustomed to seeing some price negotiations end with the government issuing a
compulsory license, but they strongly resisted the Thai move to start local production of the heart and
cancer drugs. Though health access activists hailed the decision as a great victory, and pressured
Novartis to drop its efforts to defend its letrozole patent, the Thai choices drew attention to the potential for
using claims about rights to “essential medicines” or the need to secure “treatments addressing global
pandemics” for medications treating other diseases. While HIV treatments tenofovir, lopinavir/ritonovir and
efavirenz are included on the WHO list of “essential medicines,” letrozole, docataxel, and erlinotab are not
on that list.39
The companies affected by the compulsory licenses on heart and cancer drugs feared that other
governments would emulate Thailand’s expanded practices and reacted very strongly. They not only
continued their lobbying of the Bush administration in the United States to threaten trade retaliation; they
also decided to limit their dealings in Thailand by withdrawing other drugs from that country's market. The
“Market Watch: Pharmaceuticals” and Bloomberg report available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=a6sFuqDEGDKU (accessed 27 March 2010).
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notion that Thai ideas might catch on elsewhere received some credence from a June 2009 speech by
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez. In the course of a dispute over prices with some US-based firms, he
stated that “A song is intellectual property, but an invention or a scientific discovery should be knowledge
for the world, especially medicine.”40
The new leftist government in Ecuador also took aim at drug patents with a presidential decree establishing
procedures for granting compulsory licenses and issuing one for importation of a generic version of the
Ritonavir/Lopinavir combination. In a discussion in the WTO’s TRIPS Council, which addresses intellectual
property rights issues, the Egyptian representative expressed a hope this would help dissipate “the stigma”
attached to compulsory licensing.41
Besides threats or actual uses of compulsory licensing, the second round of controversy over patents has
also included a good deal of effort to limit the number patents and the scope of patent protection by
defining the “novelty” required for a patent in demanding terms. This is another area of what trade lawyers
call “flexibilities" in the TRIPS Agreement because the Agreement does not define the degree of novelty
required for issuing a patent. Each country can decide this question on its own.
Local AIDS and health activists, social movements advocating for the poor, and the generics-based
segment of the Indian pharmaceutical industry showed lively interest in these possibilities as India’s patent
law was revised in preparation for coming into compliance with the TRIPS Agreement. After considerable
debate, the Patent (Amendments) Act 200542 included provisions:
a. allowing citizens, associations, and firms to object to patent applications before the Patent
Office has issued a patent and to petition for its revocation after a patent has been issued;
b. allowing revocation of a patent when revocation is “in the public interest;”
c. limiting patents to new products, thus excluding attempts to “evergreen” a patent by securing
separate patents on new uses of a previously-patented product; and
d. including in the definition of “novelty” a requirement that the advance be “non-obvious”
The first challenge to a drug patent application under the new Indian law was filed in 2005 by the Cancer
Patients Aid Association against Novartis’ application for a patent on Glivec, its brand name for imanatib
mesylathe, a very effective leukemia treatment. The Cancer Patients Aid Association argued that this
application did not qualify for a patent because imanatib mesylathe was merely another form of an alreadyknown substance, imanatib, that Novartis had already patented in 1993. In 2006 the Patent Office rejected
Novartis’ patent application, and Novartis appealed to the courts. Novartis’ lawyers framed their appeal as
As reported by Reuters, June 21, 2009. See http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN2148323120090621 (accessed 27 March
2010).
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an argument that the rejection should not stand because Indian patent law had a more restrictive definition
of novelty than allowed under the TRIPS agreement. Activists regarded the appeal as a challenge to the
new Patent Law as a whole and organized a global campaign to pressure Novartis into dropping its appeal.
Novartis persisted, only to have the court rule that any claim that national law is incompatible with TRIPS
has to be settled in the WTO dispute-settlement process (an inter-state process not open to private firms),
not in national courts. Though the ruling side-stepped rather than addressed the substance of Novartis’
claim, it left the rejection in place. Activists perceived the ruling as putting “patients before patents” and
prepared to file more objections to other patents.43
Tibotec Pharmaceuticals’ protease inhibiter Darunavir (DRV) and Gilead Science’s Tenofovir came under
close scrutiny when the companies filed for drug registration and patent protection in India in 2009. Tibotec
had already made arrangements for royalty-free production of Darunivir by Indian generics maker Emcure
when it submitted its applications. As Indian authorities considered the applications, both drugs were the
subject of much anticipation. It was widely known that Darunavir taken either alone or with Ritonavir was
as effective as other treatments in adults whose HIV viral loads were already suppressed by drug treatment
and appeared to inspire HIV mutations. Tenofovir has also proven more effective than earlier therapies.
Though both companies argued their drugs deserved patent protection under the 2005 Act criterion of
showing enhanced efficiency, Indian activists and Indian generics drug maker Cipla filed petitions
challenging that claim. The Indian Patent Office rejected Tibotec’s and Gilead’s applications and Indian
courts upheld that rejection in September 2009.
Activists were very happy with the decision, maintaining that the denial of patent protection would help
“save countless lives in the developing world.”44 Some observers worried that the question might be
reopened if the Indian Supreme Court ruled in favor of Novartis in it’s appeal of decision against granting it
a patent on Glivec, but health policy makers moved ahead. Health ministries in a number of developing
countries that had been holding back added Darunavir and Tenofovir to their sets of HIV treatments
because the rejection meant that Indian generics houses would be able to export the drug without any
restrictions.45
Impact on Prices and Distribution
Campaigns to force down the prices charged for the drugs used in antiretroviral treatment have gained
notable successes. In early summer 2007 the Clinton Foundation was able to secure a "once a day" pill
combining tenofovir, efavirenz, and lamivudine from Indian generics makers Cipla and Matrix for somewhat
less than $365 per person per year. This was more expensive than the $99 per person per year for which it
Weissman, “Big pharma” pp. 13-15 and Ruth David 2007. “Novartis Set Back In India Patent Fight Over Glivec.” Forbes.
Aug. 7, 2007. Available at http://www.forbes.com/2007/08/07/novartis-glivec-generics-markets-equitycx_rd_0807markets02.html (accessed 2 April 2010).
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could buy first-line combinations, but comparable to the prices of first-line ARTs when they were introduced
in the mid 1990s. Also in 2007, the lowest price for a generic version of heat-stable lopinavir/ritonavir was
$695 per person per year. This was higher than the price patent-holder Abbott Laboratories charged
governments of least developed countries for its Kaletra brand, but lower than what it charged governments
of middle income countries.46
Efforts to assess the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and the proportion of HIV-infected persons receiving
antiretroviral treatment remain plagued by large amounts of uncertainty. Social stigmas attached to HIV
and AIDS in many countries discourage the infected from getting tested or securing treatment. The costs
of tests and availability of clinics create other barriers unaffected by lowering prices of HIV drugs.
Continuing lack of a vaccine or a cure for HIV means that how much the need for antiretroviral treatment
increases depends on the success of efforts to contain the pandemic. So far, containment efforts have
varying degrees of success. The spread has been less extensive in Asia than in Africa; in developed
countries the spread is limited to those engaged in the most risky behaviors. The joint UN Program on
AIDS estimated in 2009 that 4 million persons worldwide were receiving ART, 6 million fewer than the 10
million estimated to need treatment. More discouragingly is also estimated that the number of new
infections around the world was 35% higher than the number of HIV-related deaths.47 Thus the total of
persons needing ART continues to rise. Wherever spread continues, the scale of the pandemic is creating
huge needs that are limiting what governments can do to address other health issues.48
However the basic humanitarian claim that life-saving treatments should be available for all who need them
will not fade. Values of human rights, community, and human solidarity, though based on different ethical
principles and justifications, combine to give humanitarian appeals strong pull in most societies. While the
continuing debate about the efficacy of promoting innovation through systems of intellectual property rights
usually rests on differing conclusions regarding what is economically optimal, creation and maintenance of
intellectual property rights – including patents -- in areas of technology applied to fulfilling basic human
needs will also be assessed on ethical grounds.49
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Humanitarian concern about the lack of drug development relevant to diseases endemic in many developing countries has led
to some interesting industry-foundation initiatives, such as the Wellcome Trust-Merck joint establishment of the Hilleman
Laboratories in India to pursue research and development of drugs and vaccines designed for developing country conditions
(see http://www.hillemanlaboratories.in/news/) and GlaxoSmithKline’s “Open Lab” opening up company databases and places in
one of the company’s own labs for medical scientists working on drugs that will be used against major diseases in developing
countries (see January 2010 press release available at www.gsk.com).
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